Institute for Software Research International
School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University


Receipt-Free Homomorphic Elections
and Write-in Voter Verified Ballots

Alessandro Acquisti

April 2004

Keywords: Electronic voting, Receipt-Freeness, uncoercibility, write-in ballots, voter verified (verifiable) ballots, homomorphic encryption, Paillier cryptosystem.

We present a voting protocol that protects voters privacy and achieves universal verifiability, receipt-freeness, and uncoercibility without ad hoc physical assumptions or procedural constraints (such as untappable channels, voting booths, smart cards, third-party randomizers, and so on). We discuss under which conditions the scheme allows voters to cast write-in ballots, and we show how it can be practically implemented through voter-verified (paper) ballots. The scheme allows voters to combine voting credentials with their chosen votes applying the homomorphic properties of certain probabilistic cryptosystems.

25 pages

Return to: SCS Technical Report Collection
School of Computer Science homepage

This page maintained by