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CMU-ISRI-03-105
Institute for Software Research International
School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University
CMU-ISRI-03-105
Coordinating Multi-Attribute Procurement Auctions
Subject to Finite Capacity Considerations
Jiong Sun, Norman M. Sadeh
April 2004
CMU-ISRI-03-105.pdf
Keywords: Supply chain management, procurement, reverse auvtion,
finite
Reverse auctions offer the prospect of more efficiently matching
suppliers and producers in the face of changing market conditions.
Prior research has ignored the temporal and finite capacity
constraints under which reverse auctioneers typically operate.
In this paper, we consider the problem faced by a manufacturer that
can procure multiple key components from a number of possible suppliers
through multi-attribute reverse auctions. Bids submitted by prospective
suppliers include a price and a delivery date. The manufacturer has
to select a combination of supplier bids that will maximize its
overall profit, taking into account its own finite capacity and the
prices and delivery dates offered by different suppliers for the
same components. The manufacturer's profit is determined by the
revenue generated by the products it sells, the costs of the
components it purchases as well as late delivery penalties it
incurs if it fails to deliver products in time to its own customers.
We provide a formal model of this important class of problems,
discuss its complexity and introduce rules that can be used to
efficiently prune the resulting search space. We also introduce
a branch-and-bound algorithm and an efficient heuristic search
procedure. Computational results show that our heuristic procedure
typically yields solutions that are only a few percent from the
optimum. They also indicate that taking into account finite
capacity considerations can significantly improve the manufacturer's
bottom line.
42 pages
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