# The Impact of Expressiveness on the Effectiveness of Privacy Mechanisms for Location Sharing

**Michael Benisch, Patrick Gage Kelley, Norman Sadeh, Tuomas Sandholm, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Paul Hankes Drielsma, Janice Tsai**

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School of Computer Science
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 15213

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**Abstract**

A recent trend on the Web is a demand for higher levels of expressiveness in the mechanisms that mediate interactions such as the allocation of resources, matching of peers, or elicitation of opinions. In this paper, we demonstrate the need for greater expressiveness in *privacy mechanisms*, which control the conditions under which private information is shared on the Web. We begin by adapting our recent theoretical framework for characterizing expressiveness to this domain. By leveraging prior results, we are able to prove that any increase in allowed expressiveness for privacy mechanisms leads to a *strict* improvement in their efficiency (i.e., the ability of individuals to share information without violating their privacy constraints). We validate these theoretical results with a week-long human subject experiment, where we tracked the locations of 30 subjects. Each day we collected their stated ground truth privacy preferences regarding sharing their locations with different groups of people. Our results confirm that i) most subjects had relatively complex privacy preferences, and ii) that privacy mechanisms with higher levels of expressiveness are significantly more efficient in this domain.

# 1 Introduction

A recent trend on the Web is a demand for higher levels of expressiveness in the mechanisms that mediate interactions, such as the allocation of resources, matching of peers, or elicitation of opinions. This trend has already manifested itself in combinatorial auctions and auctions that allow other complex forms of expression. It is also reflected in the richness of preference expression offered by businesses as diverse as matchmaking sites, sites like Amazon and Netflix, and services like Google's AdSense. In Web 2.0 parlance, this demand for increasingly diverse offerings is called the Long Tail [2].

Intuitively it would seem that this trend towards increased expressiveness has been driven by an increase in efficiency (e.g., due to better matching of supply and demand). Efficiency improvements have indeed been reported from combinatorial and multi-attribute auctions (e.g., [10, 26, 27]) and expressive mechanisms for auctioning advertisements on the Web [5, 7].

Over the past few years we have seen an explosion in the use of applications such as social networking, photo/video sharing, and location sharing web sites. These sites thrive on the exchange of individual's personal information and content that users have created. While there is clearly a desire for users to share this information with each other, recently we have started to see a change in attitude, with users demanding greater control over the conditions under which their information is shared. This change has led to expanded privacy controls on sites such as Facebook and Flickr.

In this paper, we apply our recent theoretical framework [6] for studying expressiveness to the domain of privacy for Web-based information sharing. We focus on a class of mechanisms that we call *privacy mechanisms*, or mechanisms that allow individuals to control the circumstances under which certain pieces of private information are shared.

Our adapted notions of expressiveness can be used to characterize the level of control an individual has over how his or her private information is released, under different privacy mechanisms. Using our theoretical framework, we are able to prove that more expressiveness can be used to design more efficient privacy mechanisms – or mechanisms that allow individuals to share more of the information they want to share, without violating their privacy constraints.

We chose to validate these theoretical results with a week-long human subject experiment in the context of a location sharing application. More than 40 different location sharing applications exist on the Web today, many of which emerged over the last year.[1] These applications allow users to share their location (frequently their exact location on a map) in addition to other types of information, but have extremely limited privacy controls. Typically, these mechanisms only allow users to express *black lists*, or individuals with whom they would never share their locations.

Recent work has suggested that individuals require significantly more expressiveness than this to capture their true preferences about sharing their location [8, 9, 18, 20, 25, 30]. The

[1] This rapid increase Web-based location sharing services is largely due to the introduction of an easy-to-use location sharing API, created by Yahoo! Brickhouse, called FireEagle.

goal of our experiment was to better understand the complexity of real-world privacy preferences, and to determine the most appropriate forms of expressiveness for privacy mechanisms that control access to location information. We tracked 30 subjects for one week, and analyzed more than 3,800 hours of location information with corresponding subject-stated ground truth privacy preferences. Among our most striking findings are the following:

- Most subjects have complex privacy preferences regarding when, where, and with whom their locations can be shared.
- The privacy settings offered by today's Web-based location sharing applications (i.e., black lists) appear to be unsuitable to the wide array of privacy preferences revealed by our study. This finding may help explain the lack of broad adoption encountered by these applications so far.
- Mechanisms that allow subjects to hide locations based only on time of day, or based only on location, are roughly equivalent in terms of their performance. However, for individuals in the university community, location appears to be significantly more important than time.
- Expressions about time and location do not appear redundant. Allowing subjects to block certain individuals from seeing their locations based on time of day *and* location leads to significantly better performance than either time or location on its own.

# 2 Theoretical background

In prior work, Benisch, Sadeh and Sandholm [6] introduced the first domain-independent framework for studying expressiveness in mechanisms. This framework allows us to meaningfully characterize the expressiveness of different mechanisms, and demonstrates the strong ties between a mechanism's expressiveness and its efficiency. In this section, we describe how we can adapt this theory to study privacy mechanisms.

One key difference between the formal model of expressiveness in this paper, and that of earlier work is a move to a single agent setting. In this paper, we assume that the behaviors of agents other than the one making an expression are stochastic, rather than strategic (e.g., requests for one's private information are assumed to come from some probability distribution, rather than the behavior of other rational agents). Despite this difference, we will show that our theoretical framework for studying expressiveness can be naturally applied to this domain.

## 2.1 A general privacy mechanism model

The formal setting we study in this paper is that of a single request for a piece of private information, such as an individual's geographical location. We assume that a request can be described by a vector of $m$ attributes, $\vec{a} = \{a_1, a_2, \ldots a_m\}$, such as the individual behind

the request, or the time the request was placed. In general, each of these attributes can be discrete valued or real valued (however, in practice we discretize real-valued attributes, such as time). We assume that the attribute vector, $\vec{a}$, of a request is stochastically drawn from the set of all possible requests, $\vec{A}$, according to a joint probability distribution, which we denote as $P(\vec{a})$.

In our model, an agent interacting with the mechanism has a type, $t$, which is unknown to the mechanism. The agent's type is drawn according to some probability distribution, $P(t)$, from the set of all possible types, $T$, and represents the agent's attitude towards releasing any piece of private information under any circumstance (the set of all types can be finite or infinite). For example, an agent may have a type that is highly secretive about releasing its location during certain times of day, or its type may be more concerned about releasing certain locations.

The agent interacts with the mechanism by making an expression about its privacy preferences, which we denote as $\theta$, from the space of all possible expressions, $\Theta$. Based on the privacy preferences that the agent expresses and the attributes of a request, the mechanism computes the value of a binary outcome function, $f(\Theta, \vec{A}) \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$. The outcome function determines whether the request is granted (i.e., when $f(\theta, \vec{a}) = 1$) or denied (i.e., when $f(\theta, \vec{a}) = 0$). [2]

We assume that the agent has a utility function, $u$, which depends on the agent's type, the attributes of a request, and the outcome chosen by the mechanism. The utility function maps these inputs to a real-valued utility indicating how happy or unhappy the agent is with the outcome chosen by the mechanism, $u(T, \vec{A}, \{0, 1\}) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. We will also define an agent's strategy, $h(T) \rightarrow \Theta$, as a mapping from each possible type to an expression. A strategy dictates how the agent will interact with the mechanism depending on its type. Typically we assume that the agent will choose a strategy, $h^*$, that maximizes its expected utility.

$$h^*(t) = \arg\max_{\theta} \int_{\vec{a}} P(\vec{a}) u(t, \vec{a}, f(\theta, \vec{a}))$$

Using this model we can describe the expected efficiency of a particular privacy mechanism with the following equation (where expectation is taken over the possible types of the agent and the different possible request attributes, when attributes and types are considered to be discrete the integrals in the following equation would be summations instead):

$$E[\mathcal{E}(f)] = \int_t P(t) \int_{\vec{a}} P(\vec{a})\ u(t, \vec{a}, f(h^*(t), \vec{a})) \tag{1}$$

## 2.2 Policy-based utility functions

In our empirical analysis we focus on one simple class of utility functions, which we call *policy-based utility functions*. An agent always has some underlying privacy preference function,

[2] In this paper we assume that the outcome function is binary: it either grants or denies a request. However, it is possible to generalize our notion of binary outcomes to include cases where a request can be granted to differing degrees, such as releasing an individual's city, rather than exact location.

$\pi(T, \vec{A}) \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, which indicates the outcome that the agent prefers for any possible request. With a policy-based utility function we assume that the agent suffers a cost $c$ whenever the mechanism inappropriately grants a request, the agent suffers a cost of $c'$ whenever the mechanism denies a request that should have been granted, and the agent receives reward $r$ whenever the mechanism correctly releases information. Typically we assume that the cost for mistakenly revealing a piece of private information is much greater than the reward for correctly sharing it, (i.e., $c >> r$). Table 1 illustrates this class of utility functions under each of the four possible scenarios: i) the mechanism correctly grants, ii) correctly denies, iii) inappropriately grants or iv) inappropriately denies.

| | Mechanism denies ($f(\theta, \vec{a}) = 0$) | Mechanism allows ($f(\theta, \vec{a}) = 1$) |
|---|---|---|
| Agent denies ($\pi(t, \vec{a}) = 0$) | $u(t, \vec{a}, f(\theta, \vec{a})) = 0$ | $u(t, \vec{a}, f(\theta, \vec{a})) = -c$ |
| Agent allows ($\pi(t, \vec{a}) = 1$) | $u(t, \vec{a}, f(\theta, \vec{a})) = -c'$ | $u(t, \vec{a}, f(\theta, \vec{a})) = r$ |

Table 1: An illustration of the policy-based utility function class under each of the four possible scenarios: i) the mechanism correctly grants, ii) correctly denies, iii) inappropriately grants or iv) inappropriately denies.

## 2.3 Impact-based expressiveness

In our prior work on expressiveness, we introduced a measure called *impact dimension* as a measure of the expressiveness of mechanisms [6]. Impact dimension measures the extent to which an agent can impact the outcome that is chosen by a mechanism, by counting the number of different *impact vectors* that an agent can distinguish among. In a privacy mechanism, an impact vector describes the impact of a particular expression by an agent under all possible requests that could be placed for the agent's information.

**Definition 1** (impact vector)**.** *An* impact vector *is a function,* $g : \vec{A} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$*. To represent the function as a vector of outcomes, we impose some strict order on the possible requests in* $\vec{A}$*, then* $g$ *can be represented as* $\{0, 1\}^{|\vec{A}|}$*.*

We say that an agent can *express* an impact vector if there exists at least one expression that the agent can make in order to cause each of the outcomes in the impact vector to be chosen by the mechanism.

**Definition 2** (express)**.** *An agent can* express *an impact vector,* $g$*, if* $\exists\theta, \quad \forall\vec{a}, \quad f(\theta, \vec{a}) = g(\vec{a})$*.*

We say that an agent can *distinguish* among a set of impact vectors if it can express each of them by changing its expression under the same collection of possible requests.

**Definition 3** (distinguish)**.** *An agent can* distinguish *among a set of impact vectors,* $G$*, if* $\forall g \in G, \quad \exists\theta, \quad \forall\vec{a}, \quad f(\theta, \vec{a}) = g(\vec{a})$*. When this is the case we write* $D(G) = \top$*.*

Intuitively, more expressive privacy mechanisms allow an agent to distinguish among larger sets of impact vectors. The adaptation of the impact dimension measure for the privacy mechanism setting captures this intuition; it measures the number of different impact vectors that an agent can distinguish among.

**Definition 4** (impact dimension)**.** *A privacy mechanism has* impact dimension $d$ *if the largest set of impact vectors,* $G^*$*, that an agent can distinguish among has size* $d$*. Formally,*

$$d = \max_{G} \left\{ |G| \;\middle|\; D(G) = \top \right\}$$

## 2.4 Expressiveness and efficiency

We will now demonstrate that a privacy mechanism's expected efficiency is closely related to its expressiveness level. Our first result shows that when designing a privacy mechanism, any increase in allowed expressiveness can be used to achieve strictly higher expected efficiency.[3]

**Theorem 1.** *For any utility function, distribution over agent types, and distribution over request attributes, the expected efficiency (given in equation 1) for the best privacy mechanism limiting an agent to impact dimension* $d$ *increases* strictly *monotonically as* $d$ *goes from* 1 *to* $d^*$*, where* $d^*$ *is the minimum impact dimension needed to reach full efficiency.*

*Proof intuition.* The proof is by induction on $d$. Briefly, if a mechanism's impact dimension is less than $d^*$, then there is at least one impact vector needed for full efficiency that cannot be expressed. Increasing the impact dimension by one will allow agents to express at least one additional impact vector and thus strictly increase the mechanism's expected efficiency.□

In addition, we see that even a small increase in allowed expressiveness can be used to achieve an arbitrarily large increase in a mechanism's expected efficiency.

**Theorem 2.** *There exists a utility function, a distribution over types, and a distribution over request attributes such that the best privacy mechanism limited to impact dimension* $d$ *is arbitrarily less efficient than that of the best privacy mechanism limited to impact dimension* $d + 1 < d^*$*, where* $d^*$ *is the minimum impact dimension needed for full efficiency.*

*Proof intuition.* We can construct a utility function, a distribution over types, and a distribution over requests that require impact dimension $d + 1$. Recall that an agent's utility can depend arbitrarily on the parameters of a request, $\vec{a}$, and its own type, $t$. □

These results taken together suggest that privacy mechanisms can be made significantly more efficient by designing them with greater levels of expressiveness. In the next section, we will describe an extensive human subject experiment designed to test these findings in practice.

[3]Proof of all theoretical claims can be found in the Appendix. The results in this section have been adapted to this domain from our prior work [6]. The primary departure from our prior work is the move to a stochastic setting, rather than a strategic setting.

# 3 An empirical study of location sharing privacy mechanisms

In the previous section we demonstrated how greater levels of expressiveness can be used to design more efficient privacy mechanisms in theory. We now discuss a week-long human subject experiment that we performed to validate this theory with real-world data. Our findings confirm that, under certain reasonable assumptions about the cost associated with revealing sensitive information, more expressive privacy mechanisms will indeed be significantly more efficient in the context of an actual location sharing application.

## 3.1 Experiment overview

Our experiment was conducted over the course of two weeks in early October 2008. We supplied 30 human subjects with Nokia N95 cell phones[4] for one week at a time (15 subjects were run at once). The subjects were required to transfer their SIM cards to the phones we provided and use them as their primary phones for an entire week. This requirement ensured that the subjects kept their phones on their person and charged as much as possible. Each of the phones was equipped with our location tracking program, which recorded the phone's location at all times using a combination of GPS and Wi-Fi-based positioning.

Each day, subjects were required to visit our web site and upload a file containing their location information from their phone. They were then asked to audit the location information by answering a set of questions about each location that they visited since their last login. For each location a subject visited, we asked whether or not he or she would have been comfortable sharing that location with different groups of individuals.

Subjects were paid a total of $35, corresponding to $5 per day, to compensate them for their participation in the study. We also administered surveys before and after the study to collect relevant demographics, and qualitative measures of the subjects' privacy attitudes.

## 3.2 Materials

The primary materials we used in our experiment included location tracking software written for the Nokia N95 phones, a web application that allowed subjects to audit their location information each day, a pre-screening survey to collect demographics and qualitative measures of privacy attitudes, and an exit survey. We will now describe each of these components in detail.

### 3.2.1 Location tracking software

Our location tracking software was written in C++ for Nokia's Symbian operating system. It runs continuously in the background, and starts automatically when the phone is turned

[4]These phones were generously provided by Nokia.

on. During normal operation, the software is completely transparent – it does not require any input or interaction.

When designing our software, we faced three primary challenges: i) managing its energy consumption to ensure acceptable battery life during normal usage, ii) determining the phone's location when indoors or out of view of a GPS signal, and iii) communicating a significant amount of location information back to our server without relying on expensive data channels.

To address these challenges, our software is broken down into three different modules: a *positioning module* that tracks the phone's location using a combination of GPS and Wi-Fi-based positioning, an *output module* that writes a minimal amount of location information to a file, and a *management module* that turns the positioning module on and off to save energy.

**Management module.** Our initial tests revealed that leaving the GPS unit on at all times resulted in an unacceptable battery life of 5-7 hours on average. The management module depends on the N95's built in accelerometer to address the issue of energy consumption. It constantly monitors this low energy sensor, and only activates the positioning module when the accelerometer reports substantial motion. When substantial motion is sensed, the positioning module is activated for a period of at least five minutes, which is typically the amount of time needed by the GPS unit to determine its position. After this time, the positioning module is deactivated unless additional motion is sensed. Any time new motion is sensed while the positioning module is active the deactivation is delayed by one minute.

The phone's accelerometer sensor records acceleration in three dimensions at a rate of about 40 readings per second. In our software, the output of this sensor is smoothed by maintaining a moving average of the total acceleration sensed in all directions. The duration of the moving average (2 minutes) and the threshold for determining whether or not the phone has undergone substantial motion during that period (0.1 g's after accounting for gravity) were determined empirically. In practice we found that this technique improved the phone's battery life to 10-15 hours on average.

**Positioning module.** To estimate the position of the phone, our positioning module makes use of the Nokia N95's built in GPS unit, and Wi-Fi unit. When activated, the positioning module registers itself to receive updates from the GPS unit at a regular interval (15 seconds). When the GPS unit is able to determine the phone's position, the positioning module records its latitude and longitude readings.

In our initial tests we found that the GPS signal was unreliable when the phone was indoors, and even when the phone was outdoors on cloudy days. For that reason, whenever the positioning module is active it also records the MAC addresses and signal strengths of all nearby Wi-Fi access points at a regular interval (3 minutes). Our server is able to use this information to determine the physical address of the phone using Skyhook Wireless.[5]

The subscription interval for the GPS unit and the scan interval for the Wi-Fi unit were chosen based on energy considerations. The GPS unit consumes a substantial amount of

[5]Details about the Skyhook API are available at http://skyhookwireless.com/.

energy when initially acquiring a lock on the phone's position. However, subsequent readings are relatively inexpensive, allowing us to subscribe at a fine granularity for a small marginal cost. Wi-Fi scans are performed less frequently because each scan consumes a substantial amount of energy (roughly equivalent to running the GPS for 3 minutes).

**Output module.** While the position module is active, the output module appends all location information (i.e., latitude and longitude readings from the GPS unit, or MAC addresses and signal strengths from Wi-Fi scans) to a file on the phone's built in memory. It also appends a heart beat to the file at a regular interval (3 minutes) to record exactly when the software is running. To transfer the file to our server, subjects connected their phone to a PC via USB cable and uploaded the file directly from the phone to our web application.




Figure 1: A screen shot of the web application displaying an example location between 8:48pm and 9:02am.

### 3.2.2 Web application

Each day subjects were required to visit our web site to upload their current location file and audit the location they visited that day.

**Location file processing.** When a subject uploads his or her location file to our web application, it iterates through each of the GPS and Wi-Fi readings that have been recorded since the last time the file was uploaded. Each of these readings is either associated with a location observation or a path observation between two locations. An observation was considered to be a new location whenever a subject moved more than 200 meters and remained stationary for at least 15 minutes.

**Audit administration.** After a subject's location file is processed, our web application takes the subject through a series of pages that trace his or her location since the last time the file was uploaded, in chronological order. Each page displays a location on a map inside a 200 meter ring indicating the subject's estimated location during a particular time period.[6] The times when the subject arrived and departed from the location are indicated next to the map. Each page also includes a link which allowed subjects to indicate that an observation was completely inaccurate (inaccurate observations accounted for less than 1% of the time, and were removed from our data set). A screen shot of the user interface for this part of the web application is shown in Figure 1.

Underneath the map on each page, our web application presents a collection of four questions, each of which corresponds to a different group of individuals. Each question asks whether or not the subject would have been comfortable sharing his or her location with the individuals in one of the groups. The groups we asked about in our study were: i) close friends, ii) immediate family[7], iii) anyone associated with our university, and iv) the general population. Subjects were given the option of indicating that they would have shared their location during the entire time span indicated on the page, none of the time span, or part of the time span (when part of the time is chosen, a drop down menu appears allowing the subjects to specify which part of the time they would have allowed). In addition, questions about the friends and family groups included a fourth option allowing subjects to indicate that they would have shared their location with some of the individuals in the group, but not all of them. This option was chosen less than 1% of the time and is treated as denying the entire group in our analysis. Figure 2 shows an example screen shot of a question for the close friends group.

## 3.3 Survey and data analysis

Before we present our analysis comparing the efficiency of different privacy mechanisms, we will present some results that describe the data that we collected and some relevant survey findings. Our 30 subjects were all students at our university. The sample was composed of 74% males and 26% females, with an average age of about 21 years old. Undergraduates made up 44% and graduate students made up 56% of the sample.

### 3.3.1 Survey results

In the pre-study survey, participants were asked to rate on a 7-point Likert scale (ranging from "not comfortable at all" to "fully comfortable") how comfortable they would be if their close friends, immediate family, members of the university community, or strangers could view their locations at anytime, times they had specified, or at locations they had specified.

[6]Path observations between locations were also depicted on some pages. However, we do not address those observations in this paper since they accounted for less than 1% of the observed time.

[7]For close friends and immediate family, subjects were required to provide three or four names to give them context while auditing.




Figure 2: A screen shot of an audit question asking whether or not a subject would have been comfortable sharing his or her location between 8:48pm and 9:08am. Drop down menus are only displayed because "Yes, during part of this time..." is selected.

In general subject's reported that location and time-based rules would increase their levels of comfort by a factor of about 1.25.

After using the system, we asked our participants how bad they thought it would have been on a 7-point Likert scale from "not bad at all" to "very, very bad" if the system had shared their information at times when they did not want it to be shared. Our subjects reported significant levels of dis-utility at the prospect of their locations being inappropriately shared with the university community ($M = 4.29$), and strangers groups ($M = 5.43$). In contrast, our subjects reported relatively little dis-utility at the prospect of their locations being inappropriately withheld.

We also asked our subjects if they would have answered the questions differently if we had actually been sharing their locations on the web, and almost all of the subjects (93.1%) responded that they would not have answered differently.

### 3.3.2 Descriptive statistics about the data

On average, our subjects were accurately observed for just over 75% of the time during our experiment. The graph in Figure 3 shows that our observations were distributed relatively evenly throughout the day.

We also found that most of our subjects visited 8 or fewer distinct locations throughout the week. A subject was considered to have visited a distinct location only if it was at least 200 meters from all other locations that the subject visited. Figure 4 shows the distribution over the number of distinct locations visited by our subjects.

We found that, on average, subjects spent significantly more time at one location than any others (most likely their homes). We also found that the time spent at a location appeared to




Figure 3: A graph showing the percentage of the time that we observed subjects on average during each 15 minute interval during a day.




Figure 4: A histogram showing how many distinct locations subjects visited during our experiment (a location was considered distinct if it was at least 200 meters from all other locations the subject visited).

drop off exponentially for the second, third, fourth and fifth most visited locations (Figure 5).




Figure 5: A plot showing the average amount of time that a subject spent at his or her five most visited locations.

Finally, we found that on average subjects would have been comfortable sharing their locations about 89% of the time with friends, 86% of the time with family, 46% of the time with other individuals at our university, and 26% of the time with the general population.

# 4 Expressiveness Results

## 4.1 Mechanisms we compared

In our analysis we compare the expected efficiency of the following four different privacy mechanisms. We will illustrate the differences between these mechanisms by considering a hypothetical user named "Alice," who wishes to share her location only with her friends when she is at home between the hours of 9am and 5pm.

- **Black list (BL).** The black list mechanism is the least expressive mechanism we consider; it only allows users to express whether or not they would be comfortable sharing their locations with each group at all times.

  Alice would be forced to either black list her friends, or allow them to see her at all times and at all locations.

- **Location-based (LOC).** The location-based mechanism allows users to express specific locations at which they would be comfortable sharing their locations with each group. This mechanism has a higher impact dimension, and is thus more expressive, than the BL mechanism. The LOC mechanism allows the same expressions as the BL mechanism (black listing a group can be simulated in the LOC mechanism by not sharing any locations with that group), as well as some additional expressions about specific locations.

  Alice would be faced with the choice of black listing her friends, or allowing them to see her whenever she was at home.

- **Time-based (TIME).** The time-based mechanism allows users to express time intervals (discretized into 15 minute blocks) during which they would be comfortable sharing their locations with each group (it does not consider the day of the week). Similar to the LOC mechanism, this mechanism is more expressive than the BL mechanism because it allows a larger set of possible expressions. For some distributions over possible requests, the TIME mechanism is more expressive than the LOC mechanism, but for other distributions the opposite is true. In other words, neither the LOC mechanism nor the TIME mechanism is more expressive for all possible request distributions.

  Under this mechanism, Alice would be forced to choose between black listing her friends, or sharing her location with them between 9am and 5pm, regardless of where she was.

- **Location & time-based (LOC/TIME).** The location and time-based mechanism combines the expressions of the LOC and TIME mechanisms. It allows users to express time intervals during which they would be comfortable sharing specific locations with each group. This is the most expressive mechanism we explore in this paper, however it is not fully expressive because it does not allow for different expressions based on the day of the week.

Alice would be able to express her true privacy preferences under this mechanism.

## 4.2 Discussion

We will now discuss our main results regarding the complexity of our subjects' reported privacy preferences. In comparing the performance of different privacy mechanisms, we assume that each subject provided a ground truth privacy preferences when auditing his or her location information. We also assume that each subject is equally likely to use the mechanism, and that requests are equally likely to be made at all times.

We report the expected efficiency of each mechanism, assuming that subjects have policy-based utility functions (described in Section 2). The utility functions we study provide a reward of $r = 1$ unit per hour whenever a location is correctly shared (i.e., given to a group during a time that was marked as allowed). We assume that the subjects would receive 0 utility whenever their locations are blocked (i.e., $c' = 0$), rather than penalizing them for any missed opportunities. However, subjects pay a cost $c$ whenever their locations are inappropriately shared (i.e., shared with a group during a time that was marked as not allowed). We report results with several different utility functions by varying the value of $c$.

For each utility function, we exhaustively search for the expression that a subject would have optimally specified.[8] Thus, the expected efficiency values that we report can be taken as upper bounds on the actual expected efficiency of these mechanisms, since subjects may not behave optimally in practice.

**More expressive mechanisms have greater expected efficiency.** The first set of results, presented in Figure 6, explores the performance of different mechanisms for each of the four different groups about which we asked our subjects. For this set of results, we fixed $c = 5$ as the cost associated with inappropriately revealing a subject's location (recall that this is 5 times the reward for correctly revealing a subject's location). Under our assumptions, these results confirm the hypothesis that subjects' privacy preferences are complex enough to warrant mechanisms with higher levels of expressiveness. For three of the four groups we asked about, each increase in expressiveness lead to significantly[9] higher expected efficiency.

For the friends, family, and university community groups the LOC/TIME mechanism has significantly higher expected efficiency than all of the other mechanisms. This confirms that location-based and time-based forms of expression are not redundant. Furthermore, in all of these cases, the LOC and TIME mechanisms both have significantly higher expected efficiency than the BL mechanism. For the anyone group, the only significant difference in expected efficiency is between the BL and LOC/TIME mechanisms. Interestingly, the LOC mechanism had significantly higher expected efficiency than the TIME mechanism for the

[8]The exhaustive search for expressions decomposes in a straightforward way since each group, time, location and location/time pair can be considered independently. For example, a subject's utility for sharing a particular location does not depend on the other locations he or she has decided to share.

[9]We used a non-parametric bootstrap method to test for statistical significance between means with 95% confidence [32].

colleague group (this is probably due to the fact that many of our subjects were comfortable sharing their locations with this group while they were on campus).

The results presented in Figure 6 clearly show that the most commonly used privacy mechanism for web-based location sharing services, the black list mechanism, is too simple to capture users' complex privacy preferences. By replacing this mechanism with a more expressive one, these services would be able to better capture the privacy preferences of their users.




Figure 6: The percent of optimal expected efficiency (bars indicate 95% confidence intervals) achieved by the different mechanisms we tested broken down by group. These results assume that the cost for inappropriately revealing a location is $c = 5$, that the reward for appropriately revealing a location is $r = 1$, and that subjects would have made the best possible expression to each mechanism.

**Expressiveness is more important when information is more sensitive.** Our second set of results explores the impact of varying the cost associated with inappropriately giving out a subject's location information. For this analysis we restrict our attention to the university community group, since preferences regarding this group were the most diverse. However, our findings with respect to this analysis were similar for all of the other groups.

Figure 7 shows that the efficiency of each mechanism drops as the cost of inappropriately revealing one's location increases. As this cost goes up subjects would be forced to make more restrictive expressions (e.g., by hiding more of their locations), and would receive lower utility from using the mechanism. However, as the mechanisms become more expressive their expected efficiency deteriorates far less rapidly. This is because more expressive mechanisms allow subjects to make more precise expressions. In the location and time-based mechanism, subjects would be able to avoid specific times or locations that are sensitive while still revealing substantial amounts of information when appropriate.

**Generalizing our methodology.** The methodology we used to assess the need for more expressive privacy mechanisms in the domain of web-based location sharing applications




Figure 7: The percent of optimal expected efficiency achieved by the different mechanisms we tested for the "Colleagues" group. For these results we varied the cost associated with inappropriately sharing a location from $c = 0$ to $c = 10$. We assumed that the reward for appropriately revealing a location was fixed at 1, and that subjects would have made the best possible expression to each mechanism based on $c$.

involved three stages, which can be generalized to other applications. First, we collected a representation of our subjects' ground-truth privacy preferences and found them to be complex, as evidenced by the poor performance of simple mechanisms in Figure 6. Next, we determined the nature of the complexity inherent in our subjects' preferences, and found that location and time were both important factors. We then varied the cost associated with inappropriately sharing an individual's location, to evaluate the benefit of more expressive privacy mechanisms under different levels of sensitivity.

# 5 Related work

Prior to our original work on expressiveness in mechanisms [6], there had been relatively little work on expressiveness specifically. We discussed some related papers in the body of this paper. Here we will briefly summarize other applications that have benefited from increased expressiveness, and other work on web-based location sharing services.

## 5.1 Applications of expressiveness

One of the first applications to benefit from expressiveness was strategic sourcing. Sandholm [27, 28] described how building more expressive mechanisms—that generalize both CAs and multi-attribute auctions—for supply chains has saved billions of dollars that would have been lost due to inefficiency. Success with expressive auctions in sourcing has also been reported by others [10, 15, 21].

Some work on expressiveness has begun to appear in the context of search keyword auctions (aka sponsored search). Benisch, Sadeh and Sandholm directly addressed the question

of expressiveness in this domain [5]. They showed that adding slightly more expressiveness to traditional ad auction mechanisms, in the form of an extra bid for premium slots, leads to a significant efficiency improvement for some simulated advertiser preferences. Even-Dar, Kearns and Wortman examined an extension of sponsored search auctions, whereby bidders can purchase keywords associated with specific contexts [11]. Under certain probabilistic assumptions they are able to prove that the system becomes more efficient when this extra level of expressiveness is allowed. In a working paper, Milgrom explores the equilibria of sponsored search auctions with limited expressive power [22]. He finds that by *limiting* expressiveness the auction excludes some bad equilibria. This raises an important counterpoint to our work. In another recent paper on sponsored search auctions, Abrams et. al. studied the impact of inexpressive bids on efficiency [1]. They show that an inexpressive mechanism can have an efficient *full information* Nash equilibrium even when bidder valuations are complex.

Another application area that has received recent attention with regard to expressiveness is wireless spectrum trading. For example, Gandhi *et al.* [12] described a prototype wireless spectrum market mechanism. They stressed the importance of allowing spectrum bidders enough expressiveness to communicate their needs, and demonstrated—using synthetic demand distributions and various *ad hoc* bidder behavior models—that their mechanism has good efficiency properties.

### 5.2 Location sharing services

Many research groups have developed location-based services similar to the one we used in our study, including: PARC's Active Badges [31], Active Campus [4], MyCampus [24], Intel's PlaceLab [14], and MIT's iFind [17]. However their focus has been on increasing the accuracy of reported locations, and implementing the privacy policies of their users.

To actually explore privacy concerns around location information diary studies and laboratory experiments [4, 9, 23], small group testing [3, 18, 29], and interviews [13, 16, 19] have all been used extensively. Across these we see people do have privacy concerns when sharing their location information however these systems have not been tested formally or in the field.

## 6 Conclusions and future work

Over the past few years we have seen an explosion in the use of applications such as social networking, photo/video sharing, and location sharing web sites. These sites thrive on the exchange of individuals personal information and content that users have created. While there is clearly a desire for users to share this information with each other, recently we have started to see a change in attitude, with users demanding greater control over the conditions under which their information is shared. Our results suggest that as web sites begin to expand their privacy controls, it is imperative that they include expressiveness that captures their user's true preferences.

In this paper, we applied our recent theoretical framework for studying expressiveness to the domain of privacy for Web-based information sharing. We focused on a class of mechanisms that we call *privacy mechanisms*, or mechanisms that allow individuals to control the circumstances under which certain pieces of private information are shared.

We proved that any increase in allowed expressiveness for privacy mechanisms leads to a *strict* improvement in their efficiency. We validated these results with a week-long human subject experiment, where we tracked the locations of 30 subjects. Each day we collected their stated ground truth privacy preferences regarding sharing their locations with different groups of people.

Our empirical results confirmed that i) most subjects had relatively complex privacy preferences, and ii) that privacy mechanisms with higher levels of expressiveness are significantly more efficient when information is sufficiently sensitive. Thus, the fact that most location sharing services use simple black list mechanisms, which do not match the privacy preferences revealed in our study, may help explain the lack of broad adoption encountered by these applications so far.

The findings in this paper open several avenues for future work. We can explore additional dimensions of expressiveness, such as allowing expressions based on the day of the week (however, this would require a multi-week study), or the resolution at which the location information is provided (e.g., neighborhood, city, or state). Future work should also address the increase in user burden associated with increasing expressiveness. This increase in user burden could potentially lead to a discrepancy between a mechanism's optimal efficiency and the actual efficiency achieved by real users.

# 7 Acknowledgments

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# 8 Appendix

*Theorem 1.* The set of mechanisms with impact dimension $d$ is a super-set of the mechanisms with impact dimension $d' < d$. Thus the fact that the efficiency for the best mechanism increases weakly monotonically is trivially true. The challenge is proving the strictness of the monotonicity.

Consider increasing $d$ from $d^{(1)} < d^*$ to $d^{(2)} > d^{(1)}$. Let $G^{(1)}$ be the best set of impact vectors that an agent could distinguish between when restricted to $d^{(1)}$ vectors (i.e., the set of impact vectors that would maximize the mechanism's expected efficiency). We know that there are at least $d^* - d^{(1)} \geq 1$ impact vectors needed to reach full efficiency that cannot be expressed, and thus at least that many impact vectors that are absent from $G^{(1)}$. When we increase our expressiveness limit from $d^{(1)}$ to $d^{(2)}$, we can add one of those missing vectors to $G^{(1)}$ to get $G^{(2)}$. Since $G^{(2)}$ allows an agent to distinguish among all the same vectors as $G^{(1)}$ *and* an additional vector which corresponds a more efficient set of outcomes, the new mechanism with impact dimension $d^{(2)}$ has a strictly higher expected efficiency. □

*Theorem 2.* Since an agent's utility function can depend arbitrarily on its type and the attributes of a request, we can construct a scenario in which the agent requires impact dimension at least $d + 1$ or it will experience an arbitrarily high cost. First we must ensure that the agent has at least $d + 1$ types with non-zero probability. Next we choose a set of impact vectors, $G^{(1)}$, of size $d + 1$. For each of the distinct impact vectors in $G^{(1)}$ we can ensure that it gives the agent arbitrarily more utility than all other impact vectors for at one of the agent's types. By the pigeon hole principle, the agent will be unable to express at least one of the impact vectors in $G^{(1)}$ in any mechanism with impact dimension $d$. Thus

increasing a limit on impact dimension from $d$ to $d+1$ will lead to an arbitrary increase in efficiency. $\square$