Much of the past work on voting systems focuses on ranked voting systems, which have a number of limitations such as Arrow's Theorem [1]. In this paper we consider ranked voting systems as well as the less commonly used class of rated voting systems. The systems differ in that ranked voting systems only allow the voter to order the candidates, while in rated voting systems the voter can score each candidate independently. In 2000, Warren Smith [4] evaluated ranked and rated voting systems under a Monte Carlo simulation model of voter utilities and behaviors. We replicate Smith's results with a wider selection of voting systems, voter utility distributions, and polling models, and conclude different polling models lead to significantly different evaluations of the voting systems.

This project's source code is freely available online.

49 pages

Thesis Committee:
David Sleator (Chair)
Daniel Anderson
Fei Fang

Srinivasan Seshan, Head, Computer Science Department
Martial Hebert, Dean, School of Computer Science

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